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Case No. 7171 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SILVER KING COALITION MINE:S 
. COMPANY, a corporation, and CONTI-
. NENTAL _CASUALTY C·OMP ANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaint~ffs, 
vs. 
1 !t.{·-
··· . · INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-SION OF UTAH 
_ and SUSAN J. MITCHELL, mother of · 
- ,:~'- · · .. · Lester A. Mitche~, deceased, 
· · · Defendants. 
PLAINTIF~S' BRIEF 
An~ () o· 'nnn 
- "'~ ,_, . •~~lu SHIRLEY P. JONE,S, 
-------------------------- ----- A~ttorMy foil' Ploi.intiffs 
ClERK, SUP!lE~t: CCUHT, UT~\H 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SILVER KING C'OALITION MINES 
CO~fp ANY, a corporation, and CO·NTI-
NENTAL CASUALTY c·O~fP ANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
IND'US'TRIAL COMMIS~SION OF U·Tl\H 
and SUSAN J. MIT·OHELL, mother of 
Lester A. Mitchell, deceased, 
Def oowarnts. 
PLAINTIFF1S·' BRIE·F 
Case No. 
7171 
This case and case No. 7172. in this court involve 
the same plaintiffs and very similar facts. Both cases 
demonstrate the arbitrary and capricious action of the 
Industrial Cnmmission in making an award after refus-
ing an autopsy. In both cases the employee was. dead 
and buried before we ever heard of the case, in both 
cases the medical evidence fails to measure up, to the 
requirements of our statute, and in both cases. the record 
demonstrates the high-handed manner in which the In-
dustrial Commission pToceeded in order to find against 
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2 
us. We believe the court will find it helpful to consider 
the two eases. together. The unfairness and arbitrariness 
of the Commission is. apparent in each case, but when 
they are considered together it is more th'an wpparent 
that the Industrial ·Commission has. adopted a course 
of p;rocedure which forecloses emp·loyers from having 
fair and impartial hearings. 
Both cases are here on Certiorari from the Indus-
trial Commission to review awards of the Commission 
granting compensation on account of death claimed from 
an occupational dise·ase, to-wit: silicosis. While the cir-
cumstances, facts and applicable law are in many res-
pects similar, we have felt that it would be more help-
ful to the court to consider each case in a brie.f devoted 
to that case rather than to attempt to ·consolidate the 
two cases in one brief. 
Lester A. Mitchell was an emp,loyee of the plaintiff 
Silver King Coalition Mines Com·pany at its mine in 
Park City, and the plaintiff Continental c~asualty Com-
pany carries the W orlrman 's Compensation insurance 
for the mining comp·any. Mr. Mitchell left his employ-
ment with the mining company on D:e·cember 10 or 12, 
1946 because he was not physically able to perform his 
work. (R. 22, 38) He died June 6, 1947. (R. 3, 38) 
It is not clear how long he worked for the plaintiff min-
ing ·comp·any. The application for compensation, (R. 3), 
states that he worked for the mining company from 
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July 28, 1937, to Decemher 13, 1946. His associate, A. J. 
Frantz, stated that he was off for one year during 1938 
and then worked until December 13, 1946. (R. 37, 38) 
A period of eight years and five months.. Although Dr. 
Wherritt said that the deceased had mentioned that he 
worked for the nrining company or in the area around 
Park City for twenty-two years, that was only the doc-
tor's impression, and he is not sure of it. (R. 28, 29) 
The definite evidence shows that he worked a maximum 
of eight years and five months which was not continuous. 
His continuous employment pTior to his death was eight 
years. 
Up until the last few months he appeared normal 
and active. (R. 22) On December 9·, however, he was 
examined by Dr. Wherritt, and his condition was such 
that he discontinued work because he was physically 
unable to work. (R. 23) The immediate cause of his 
death was congestive heart failure. (R. 24) At the 
hearing Dr. Wherritt said the heart failure was due to 
silicosis, although the Commission was advised before 
the hearing that Dr. Wherritt's death certifi'Cate did 
not give silicosis as a cause of death. (R. 6;5) The doc-
tor, however, did not take any x-rays but had them 
taken by Dr. Viko. He does not do that work. (R. 24) 
Five or six months before his death Mr. Mitcheli de-
veloped drop:sy which was directly due to his he'art 
trouble, which heart trouble gradually grew worse as 
time went on. (R. 25) Dr. Wherritt came to the con-
clusion that the man had silicosis because he couldn't 
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expand his lungs and was short of breath. He conceded 
that silicosis must be very pronounced or extensive to 
affect the heart. (R. 2:6, 27) He also stated that any 
disease of the heart would cause shortness of breath 
and lack of expansion in the lungs. Dr. Wherritt said 
you couldn't tel'! from physical examination alone that 
the heart trouble is due to silicosis-, and he conceded that 
all he did was make a physical examination. (R. 28) 
Dr. Wherritt first examined the man December 9, 1946, 
(R. 23), although he states that he had known him as a 
neighbor for many years but had not examined him for 
ten years. (R. 21) He also stated that he was not in a 
position to state what degree of silicosis Mr. Mitchell 
had. (R. 25) 
No claim was ever made for comp1ensation until 
September 29, 1947. (R. 3) The doctor's report was 
not filed until July 12, 1947, and the first that plaintiffs 
ever heard of Mr. Mitchell at all was a week or so after 
his death, (R. 46), by means of a letter from the Sec-
retary of the ~ocal union dated June 12, 1947, and re-
ceived June 113, 1947. (R. 60) Mr. Peterson, the repre-
sentative of the plaintiff insuran-ce company, saw Mr. 
P'ayne, the signer of the letter, exhibit 60, after he had 
received the letter and asked why we were not notified 
of these occupational disease cases until after the man 
had died, and Mr. Payne s~aid that he had informed 
claimants generally in that area in connection with occu-
pational disease not to report the case until after the 
man had died, and then in case an autopsy was re-
quested to deny the autopsy. (R. 46, 47) 
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Dr. ''Therritt sent the n1an to Dr. Viko, (R. 24), who 
exan1ined the deceased only once on December 17, 1946, 
and the result of his examination lead the doctor to the 
opinion that the man had siiicosis and cor pulmonale 
due to chronic lung disease. (R. 30) Cor pulmonale is 
enlarged heart displaced to the right due to chronic 
lung disease. (~R. 32, 34, 35) (Commonly called right 
sided heart failure.) He was of the o~pinion that the 
silicosis was not severe enough in itself to cause dis-
ablement, ''but with the heart disease he was totally 
disabled.'' The doctor stated that there could be one 
other factor in the distortion of the chest, an old em-
pyema, due to pneumonia which the man had many 
years ago. (R. 30, 31) 
The Inter-Mountain Ciinic, Dr. Viko's clinic, took 
x-rays of Mr. Mitchell December 17, 1946, No. 28863, 
and they are now here in this court as Exhibits in that 
case. (R. 31) The most striking thing rubout the x-rays 
is the heart. It is generally enlarged, and the doctor was. 
of the opinion that he had cor p.ulmonale and that he 
had diffused nodular silicosis. (R. 31) The doctor was 
of the opinion that silicosis pro·duced cor pulmona1le 
(enlargement of the heart), (R. 3:3), but there was also 
emphysema, or air in the chest cavity, present and that 
also contributed to the enlargement of the heart, and 
the emphysema and the silicosis combined caused the 
cor pulmonale, and which one is predominate would be 
hard to say. (R. 33, 34) From the x-rays alone it would 
be difficult to say that there is sufficient evidence of 
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silicosis to cause heart trouble. (R. 34) The silicosis 
shown by his x-rays is not as severe as third degree 
silicosis, and there is no area of conglomeration. By 
themselves the pictures leave some doubt as to whether 
silicosis was of sufficient severity to cause cor pulmon-
ale. (R. 3:5) Dr. Viko conceded that an autopsy would 
show the cause of death and vositively confirm the degree 
of silicosis, determine the type of heart disease and 
would rule out the possibility of any other heart disease. 
Without an autopsy the degree of silicosis is. uncertain. 
(R. 36-) 
Dr. Viko apparently was of the school of thought 
that believes that cor pulmonale can be caused by sili-
·cosis even when the silicosis is not of sufficient severity 
to lbe · disabling and the x-rays show no area of con-
glomeration. Dr. Viko did not produce x-rays which 
disclose nor did he testify his. x-rays disclose discrete 
nodules of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated through-
out both lungs. He . also conceded that the greater the 
silicosis the greater the probability of cor puhnonale. 
(R. 85) 
Dr. Richards testified, and as will appear, he is. of 
the school of thought that holds that heart trouble does 
not come from silicosis, and that if it could the silicosis 
would have to be of the greatest severity, would have to 
be disabling and would be cleariy disclosed by x-ray. 
IT:here are two schools of thought, one of which is. re~ 
ognized by Dr. Viko and not recognized by our statute, 
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and the other recognized by Dr. Richards and by our 
statute. 
Dr. Richards is one of the outstanding specialists 
on silicosis in the inter-mountain country. He is a prac-
titioner of twenty-five years, e:x:perienced with this dis-
ease and in taking x-rays. of it and interpreting the 
x-rays. (R. 40) In case No. 717'2 the a,vp'licant's attor-
ney conceded (R. 131 in that case) that in the Western 
states there is no one who has had as mueh practice and 
experience with silicosis as Dr. Richards, and that he is 
a medical expert of great and unusual talent. Dr. Rich-
ards examined the x-rays taken by Dr. Viko's., clinic, 
and those x-rays did not disclose to him any evidence 
of pulmonary heart disease. There is an enlargement of 
the heart, and there is some silicosis present. There is 
diffused nodulation throughout, especially in the right 
chest, but only a moderate amount of nodulation in the 
left chest. (R. 41) T·here is no nodulation similarly dis-
seminated throughout both lungs. From an x-ray stand-
point you cannot say that this is silicosis, but from the 
man's history you could interpret these films as. silicosis. 
There is enough suggestion of silicosis in the films to 
require a further and positive diagnosis, and if the man 
is dead, the only way to make that determination would 
be by autopisy. If an autopsy were denied, "I would say 
you would be in a pre·carious state to make a diagnosis 
of silicosis.'' (R. 41, 42) Even if this. should be silicosis 
it is not the type of silicosis that .woul~d cause de·ath. 
Whether or not silicosis can cause heart disease is an 
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extremely controversial question. Those who are most 
acquainted with silicosis do not feel that the amount of 
silicosis shown here, if it is silicosis, is the type that 
causes heart failure. The only positive way to deter-
mine it is by autopsy, and in the absence of autopsy it is 
purely speculative and controversial. (R. 43) In answer 
to leading qu~stions from the Commissioner Dr. Rich-
ards repeated that in his experience and iri the contacts 
he had had, "I would say provided this is silicosis, it is 
not the typ~e of silicosis that we see as a causative factor 
of cor pulmonale,'' and he has. never seen a case of cor 
pulmonale with that amount of silicosis. The x-rays 
show only a minimum of silicosis, if it is silicosis at all. 
('R. 44, 45) The Commissioner argued with and lead 
the doctor through several pages of the record, but the 
doctor concluded: ''It is too easy to make a diagnosis 
of a situation and then reason back to some findings to 
cause that situation. The trouble with this silicosis is 
these controversial things, that anyone. who is thoroughly 
acquainted with silicosis could not accept that as a diag-
nosis of silicosis. and say it is an ideological f'actor in 
cor pulmonale." (R. 45) We shall later in the brief 
refer to our statute defining silicosis and show that 
the pattern of silicosis is always the same ; that it is 
uniform in everybody; that in fact Dr. Viko himself 
stated: ''The only question that could arise is whether 
the silicosis was of sufficient degree to produce cor 
puhnonale. Perhaps it is not by itself; but with a con-
siderable degree of emphysema sufficient to cause cor 
pulmonale there might be a question whether the old 
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distortion of the che-st from empyema might be a factor 
I could not say." (R. 32) Dr. Richards' statement that 
the nodulation is not similarly disseminated throughout 
both lungs is not disputed, and from the record it is. 
undisputed that Dr. Viko conceded that it was ques-
tionable "rhether the silicosis p:resent was of sufficient 
severity to cause cor pulmonale. Dr. Richards was posi-
tive that it was not of sufficient severity, and both doc-
tors agreed that the positive way of determining the 
question was by autopsy. 
After we learned of the existence of Mr. Mitchell, 
which as a matter o.f fact was not until he had passe·d 
out of existence and was buried, and after we had 1ex-
hausted means of learning the cause of death, our rep--
resentative wrote to Mrs. Mitchell., the ap·plicant, Exhi-
bit 2, (R. 47, 61) calling her attention to the fact that 
the cause of death was doubtful; that he had exhausted 
his efforts to determine the cause of death, and that the 
only way it could · ·be determined was by autop·sy. He 
requested her to allow an autop,sy and stated that if the 
autopsy s-howed silicosis, payments would be made imme-
diately. To this letter Mrs. Mitchell replied, Exhibit 
3, (R. 47, 62) refusing an autopsy erroneously secure 
in her belief and for the reason that the doctor said 
it was too late because Mr. Mitchell had been dead six 
months. Mr. Peterson wrote her again, Exhibit 4, (R. 
48, 63), requesting autopsy and advising her that Dr. 
Carlquist of the L.D.S. Hospital and Dr. Ogilvie of the 
St. Marks Hospital advised that the autopsy could he 
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successfully performed. Mrs. Mitchell for no reason 
again refused the autopsy, Exhibit 5, (R. 48, 64), and 
we then applied to the Industrial Commission for an 
autop'SY setting forth the facts very fully. In the letter 
to the Commission we called attention to the fact that Dr. 
Wherritt's death certificate said the death was due to 
congestive heart failure' but did not say anything at all 
about silicosis. We called attention of the Commission 
to the fact that there was doubt that the man had died 
from silicosis; that it was po'ssible for a successful 
autorp~sy, hut the Commission refused to allow it. (Ex-
hibits 6 and 7, R. 48, 49·, 65, 66) 
As soon as we learne·d of the death we began making 
investigations. We interviewed Dr. Viko who said that 
there was an indication of silicosis, that sputum tests. 
would have to be taken to make the case more conClusive 
and gave his permission to have the x-rays examined by 
Dr. Richards. D·r. Viko told Mr. Peterson that autopsy 
was the only thing that would definitely confirm the cause 
of death. (R. 49·, 50) The x-rays were submitted to Dr. 
Richards with the result as shown. 
!The applicant testified as to the degree of her de-
pendency on the deceased, and about all that one can 
glean from the record is that he paid for the food they 
both ate and the taxes on her home, and that at one time 
he had the house fixed up, and that he paid for the fuel. 
She owned the home. She paid the light bill, bought her 
own clothes, and has an income from social security. 
:T~here is not a word of evidence as to how much he con-
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tributed to her, nor that she was dependent upon h~m. 
In this state of the record the Commission made an 
award in the same obj-e~tionable manner it did in case 
No. 7172 in a total sum and made absolutely no finding 
at all of dependency. Petition for rehearing was duly 
made, (R. 14), denied, (R. 16) The cas·e is here by cer-
tiorari. 
ST·ATEMENT OF E·RRORS 
1. The decision of the Commission is not sup·ported 
by substantial comrpetent evidence having p·robative 
value. 
2. The Commission acted without or in excess ·Of 
its powers. 
3. The Commission abused its dis-cretion in refus-
ing an autopsy in this case. 
4. The award even if properly supported is not 
in conformance with the O·ccupational Dise·ase L•aw of 
the State of Utah. 
APPLICABLE lSlTAT'UTO;RY PROVlSIONS 
U.C.A. 1943 
42-la-·29. SILICOSIS-DEFINED. 
"For the purpose of this act 'silicosis' is 
defined as a chronic. disease of the lungs caused 
by the prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust 
(Si02) characterized by small discrete nodules 
of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated through-
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out both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray 
pattern, and by variable clinical manifestations.'' 
42.-l'a-47. AU'TOPSY IN DEATH CIJAIMS. 
"On the filling of a claim for comp.ensation 
for death from an occupational disease where in 
the opinion of the commission it is ·necessary to 
accurately and scientifically ascertain the cause 
of death, an autorpsy may he ordered by any mem-
ber ·of the commission and shall be made by a 
person designated by such member of the com-
mission. The person reques:ting any· such autopsy 
shall pay the charge of the physi~ian making the 
same. Any person interested may designate a 
duly licensed physician to attend such autop.sy, 
and the findings of the physician p~erforming the 
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and 
shall be a public record. All proceedings for com-
pensation shall he susp~ended upon refusal of a 
claimant or claimants to permit such autopsy 
when so ordered. Where an autopsy has been 
·periormed pursuant to an order of any member 
of the commission no cause of action shall lie 
against any person, firm or corpoTation for par-
ticipating in or requesting such autopsy.'' 
42-la-25, as amended by Laws of 1945. COMPEN-
SATIO·N FOR SILI:CQ:S.IS..--JSCHEDULE o·F 
AMO·UNT~S-INCREA!SE OF P~ YME·N·T·S-DEATP 
BENEFIT:S 'T'O· D·E'PENDENiT·S. 
* • • 
'' (h) In case of death from silicosis the 
·dependents of the deceased employee shall receive 
, the difference between the amount paid lpirior to 
death, if any, for the total disability as in p'ara-
graph (a) of this section set forth, and a maxi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
mum sum to be determined as follows: A maxi-
mum of not to exceed $3,000 if such disability or 
death, whichever first occurs, results in the ca-len-
dar month of July, 1945, and if such disability or 
death, whichever first occurs, results in August, 
1945, a maximum of not to exceed $3.,050 and after 
August, 19·45, the maximum amount shall increase 
at the rate of $50 p·er calendar month and the 
maximum amount shall be determined in all cases 
by the month in which the disability or death, 
\vhichever first occurs, results, provided, how-
ever, that in no case of death from silicosis shall 
the employer be required to piay compensation in 
excess of the difference between the sum of $5,000 
and the amount paid, if any, for total disability 
prior to the occurrence of death. The comp·ensa-
tion for death shall be paid to such dependents 
at four week intervals at the rate of $16 per week 
plus 5% for each de~pendent minor child under 
the age of 18 years, up to and including 5 depend-
ent minor children.'' 
) 
~2-1a-33. BENEFI'T;S-TO· WH·OIM PAID-MANNER 
-TERMINATION. 
'' • • • Should any dependent of a deceased 
employee die during the period covered by such 
weekly payments, the right of such dependent to 
compensation under this act shall cease; pro-
vided, that should a widow who is th·e sole de-
pendent of the deceased employee, and who is 
receiving the benefits of tnis act, remarry during 
the period covered by such weekly payments, she 
shall be entitled to receive in a lump: sum P'ay-
ment one-third of the benefits remaining unpaid 
at the time of such remarriage. 
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"In all cases where the weekly payment is 
increased 5% or 10% for each dependent minor 
child such increase shall cease at the death, mar-
riage, attainment of the age of eighteen years, or 
termination of dependency of each such chiid. '' 
The rules of evidence and the provisions for review 
are quite different in the O·ccupational Disease Law than 
they are in the Workman's Compensation Act as fol-
lows: 
OCCUPATIONAL D'lSEASE 
42-1a-39. Id. PROCEDURE 
-EXTENT OF REVIEW. 
"* * * The review sh.a:ll not 
be extended further than to 
determine·: 
(a) Whether or not the 
Commission acted without or 
in exces.s of its powers. 
(b) Wheth.er or not find-
ings of fact are supported by 
substantial competent evi-
denc·e having probative 
value." 
42-1a-43. RULES ·OF PR·O-
CEDURE. 
"* *. * Hear-say evidence 
shall not be admissible. No 
party to any proceeding shall 
be prejudiced hy his or its 
failure to make objections or 
to take exceptions at any 
hearing.'' 
WORKMEN'S ~COM­
PENSATION 
42-1-78. ld. 
'' * * * The review shall 
not be extended further than 
to determine: 
(1) Wheth·er or not the 
Commission acted without 
or in excess of its powers. 
(2) If findings of fact 
are made, whether or not 
such findings of fact support 
the award under review." 
42-1-82. RULE'S 0 1F EVI-
DEN:CE BEFORE COMMIS-
SION. 
~Contains no s'uch provi-
sions as · those opposite and 
permits Commis·sion to make 
inve:stigations according to 
its judgment. 
ARGUME·NT 
~The facts in the other case No. 7172 in this court 
differ from this case in detail, but the two cases es-
sentially give rise to the same principles of law. A con-
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sideration of the cases involve two main subjects: (1) 
Is there substantial competent evjdence having p~robative 
value to support the findings of the Commission and (2) 
Did the C·ommission abuse its discretion in refusing an 
autopsy in this. case~ 
In this case as in the other case there is n·o evidence 
whatever that in the plaintiff mine deceased was ex-
posed for five years in the last ten to silicon dioxide dust. 
However, the foregoing two questions are also relied 
upon in this case as in the other case to annul the award 
of the C:ommission because they demonstrate not only 
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Com-
mission, but a complete lack of understanding by the 
Commission of the O'Ccupational Disease L~aw and the 
elements essentia'l to a finding of death or disab~ility 
unde-r its provirsions. 
Under the first heading naturally come the ques-
tions does the evidence comply with our statutory defi-
nition of silicosis and what actually is the substance of 
the evidence as disclosed by the testimony of ·all the wit-
nesses. Under heading II arises the ques·tion of whether 
our autopsy statute has any value whatever and whether 
part~ies have any rights whatever under it in view of the 
attitude of the present Commission. In passing may we 
re-mark at this p.oint that never before have auto~psies 
been refused by the Commission. The Commi~ssion here-
tofore always has taken the position that it s·ought for 
and required all the evidence it could secure in order 
to p·rotect the rights of both parties and make certain 
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as far as possible that actual justice was done by the 
Commission. Never until now under the Occupationai 
Disease Law has the Commission considered itself to be 
the guardian of the sentiments ·or wh'ims of one party 
against the substantial rights of the opponent. Never 
until now has the Commission taken the position that its 
function is to guard one party from possible adverse 
evidence in order to make an award against the other 
party. Also under heading II comes the point of the 
wording of the Comm'ission's award. 
I. 
IS THERE SUB·S~TANTIAL CO·MPE'TENT EVI-
D·EN·CE HAVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO SUP-., 
PORT T·HE FIND·INGS OF T·H'E COMMIS1SION¥ 
At the outset it may he well to bear in mind that 
tuberculosis itself is not an occup~ational disease ; also 
that in case of disability or death from silicosis when 
complicated with any disease other than pulmonary 
tuberculosis, compensation shall be reduced as p~rovided 
in Section 51. ( 42-la-~30). Heart disease caused the de·ath 
here. Silicosis as defined by our statute is not even 
present, and even the evidence of silicosis fails to es-
tablish it as the cause of death. 
The words ''substantial com'P'etent evidence having 
probative value" have clear and well defined meanings. 
The Federal c·ourts in construing the National Labor 
Rel~tions Act have many times had occasion to define 
''substantial evidence.'' It has frequently been contende·d 
that the court must accept the findings of the Board on 
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matters of fact. The courts uniformly hold that they are 
not required to accept the board's findings unles:s. sup-
ported by ''substantial evidence.'' In Ma~ional Dabor 
Relat'ions Board vs. Un~on Racific Stages, 99 Fed. (2) 
153 at 177 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had thisi 
to say, particularly appropriate in view of the state· of 
the record here, with reference to what constitutes sub~ 
stantial evidence. 
''It is suggested that this court should accept 
the findings of the Board; that contradictions, 
inconsistencies, and e-rroneous inferences are im-
mune from criticism or attack * * *. But the 
courts have not construe-d this language as com-
pelling the accep:tance of findings arriv·ed ~at by 
acceptilng part of the ~evicZenCie and t.ot,ally dis-
rega'ldilng other convincimg ev~denc1e. 
* * * 
" '·Substantial ·evidence' means more than a 
mere scintilla. It is of substantial and relevant 
consequence and excludes vague, uncertain, or 
irrelevant matter. It imv,lies a quality of proof 
which induces conviction and makes an imp·res-
sion on reason. It means that the one weighing 
the evidence takes into consideration .all the facts 
presented to him and ~all reasonable inferences, 
deductions an·d conclusions to be drawn therefrom 
and, -considering them in their entirety and re-
lation to each other, arrives at a fixed conviction. 
''The rule of substamtial evidenoe is one of 
fundamental importance and is the dtvidimg liwe 
betwe-en Zaw and ,arbit11ary P'ow,er. Testimony is 
the raw material out of which we construct truth 
and, unless 'all of it is w1eighed in its totality, 
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errors W'ill result arnd g;ne1at irnjustices be 
w·novug ht. '' (Italics rudded) 
And in the case of A.p~alachtian Ene1ctnc Power Co. vs. 
National L1wb,or ReZat~ons B01a~d, 93 Fed. (2) 985, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals at page 989 says con-
cerning the test of substantial evidence ''and the test 
is not satisfied by evidence which merely creates a sus-
picion or which amounts to no more than a s·cintilla o~r 
which gives equal swppo~rt to inwo'nSiSI~evnt ilnferences. '' 
( rtalics jad·ded) 
Of course, in order for evidence to he competent it 
must be giyen by one qualified to speak. When a doctor 
admits, as did Dr. Viko, that the silicosis shown by his 
x-rays is not third degree silicosis. and there is no area 
of conglomeration, that it is hard to say which disease is 
predominate in causing heart trouble; that the only 
question that can arise ill: this cas-e is to whether the 
silic'Osis was of sufficient degree to produce heart 
trouble, and that without autopsy the degree of silicosis 
present is uncertain, (R. ·30-3'6), such evidence is neither 
substantial or competent to prove that death was due to 
silicosis. This was particularly true when the doctor 
saw the patient only once and that one time was six 
months before his death. It is p-articularly question-
able whether such evid~nce is competent when it 
appears from the record that there are two schools 
of thought as to whether silicosis can cause heart 
trouble at all, and it is undisputed that in order 
to cause heart trouble it must he in the most advanced 
stage which is not present here. Also it is questionable 
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whether the doctor's testimony is competent when he 
belongs to a school of thought that is not recognized by 
our statutory definition of silicosis. And certainly, evi-
dence has no probative value where it is given either 
by an incompetent person or where the evidence itself 
discloses that it does not prove the fact for which it was. 
offered. 
Our statute as we have seen is much more exp~icit 
in Occupational Disease cases than it is in W orlanen 's 
Compens'ation cases. Not only is the commission ex-
pressly ~~r9hibited froni accepting hearsay testimony in 
Occupational Disease cases, (4l-la-4:H, supra), but the 
findings of the Commission must be supported by sub~ 
stantial comp·etent evidence having probative value. ( 42-
la-39h) Also the Commission is not left free under 
our statute to accept the opinion of either one of two 
schools o'f thought with reference to silicosis. The Legisla-
ture has already decl·ared that in this state silicosis must 
be established by proof of '' sma~ discrete nodules of 
fibrous tissue similarly disseminatHd throughout both 
lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray pattern, * * ·* '' ( 42-
la-29) The statute also defines silicosis as a chronic 
disease of the lungs. caused by a prolonged inhalation of 
silicon dioxide dust. Aside from the fact that there is 
no evidence whatever in this case that the deceased ·su·f-
fered a chronic disease of the lungs caused by the pro-
longed inhalation of sili·con dioxide dust in the Silver 
King Mine, it is our contention that there likewise is no 
X-ray ·evidence showing a characteristic X-ray pattern 
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as a result of small discrete nodules of fibrous tissue 
similarly disseminated throughout both lungs. It will 
be noted that the statutory definition agrees with Dr. 
Richards, that the pattern must be the same in all in-
dividuals; that the nodulation must be equally distri-
buted in both lungs; that there must be pTesent existing 
nodulation disclosed by x-ray, and that in the ahsence of 
these elements there can be no finding of silicosis. 
The testimony discloses in this case as it did in 
Case No. 7172 that there are two schools of thou·ght, one 
holding that cor pulmonale is never cause;d by silicosis., 
and the other school of thought holding that it can be 
caused by silicosis. Both schools of thought, however, 
agree that in order for silicosis to be a cause of cor pul-
monale the silicosis must be very severe. Our Legisla-
ture undoubtedly had before it the views of these two 
schools. I~t adop~ted the view of the s'Chool of thought 
that holds that there can he no silicosis unless there are 
''small discrete nodules of fibrous tissue similarly dis-
seminated throughout both lungs causing a characteristic 
X-ray p~attern.'' That is, the L~egislature adopted the 
school of thought relpresented by Dr. Richards, if there 
is a characteristic X-ray pattern it must he the same in 
all individuals. The p~attern is uniform. If there must be 
s~mall discrete nodules similarly disseminated thr:ovu.ghovut 
both lungs, then each lung must be the same and show 
the same p~attern in order for there to be a diagnosis 
of silicosis under our statute. The ch-aracteristic X-ray 
pattern is not p~resent here. Dr. Viko did not testify tha;t 
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it is, and Dr. Richards positively testified that there was 
no characteristic X--ray pattern here. Dr. Viko conceded 
that his X-rays sh'owed an enlarged heart, but he saw 
only a few scattered rales; he s:aid that from the pictures 
it would be difficult to find that the silicosis is of suf-
ficient severity to cause heart trouhle; that by them-
selves the pictures might leave some doubt. (R. 30, 32, 
34, 3'5) Dr. Viko did not testify that his ~pictures dis-
closed small discrete nodules similarly disseminated 
throughout both lungs, and Dr. Richards' testimony is 
undisputed that the diffused nodulation throughout was 
especiall1 in the right lung and only a moderate amount 
in the left lung; that even if this is called silicosis, of 
which he is doubtful, the amount is not sufficient to be 
a cause of death. (R. 41, 43) ·Silicosis must be a chronic 
disease of the lungs. Dr. Wherritt stated that up until 
the last few months Mr. Mitchell app~eared to be normal 
and active. (R. 22) He had not examined him for ten 
years, and he died within six months after he first went 
to see Dr. Wherritt. (R. 3, 21, 23) During all.the time 
that Mr. Frantz had worked with him he was never ill 
or had to lay off work. (R. 40) ·The pictures are here 
and need only to be looked at to see that they h·ave no 
resemblence whatever to a characteristic X-ray pattern 
of silicosis, and that there is no nodulation showing the 
same ap,pearance in both lungs. 
The testimony of Dr. Richards as we have alre·ady 
shown is positive, conclusive and largely undisputed. It 
is unneccessary to rep~eat it. The Commission complete-
ly disregarded Dr. Richards' testimony and accepte·d the 
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inconclusive testimony of Dr. Viko, which at the best 
insufficient severity from the X-rays to cause death 
shows only the possible existence of silicosis and that of 
even according to his school of thought which is not 
recognized by our statute. Mr. Peterson of the insur-
ance comp1any is not disputed in his statement that the 
death certificate which he actually saw contained no 
reference to silicosis hut gave the cause of death as con-
gestive heart failur'e. (R. 65, Exhibit 6) 
We respectfu1ly submit that there is no substantial 
competent evidence having p~rohative value to supPort 
the findings of the Commission, that the X-rays them-
selves disclose that there is no silicosis present that 
conforms to our statute. Undoubtedly, the Industrial 
Commission has "<~los·ed its mind to the fact that the 
Legislature considered this controversial question and· 
adopted the definition of silicosis advocated by those 
best informed on the subject. The Legislature excluded 
the school of thought rep,resented by Dr. Viko that per~ 
mi ts a finding of p~roba;ble silicosis where there is not 
present the elements required by our statute. The Com-
mission should be required to conform to the statutory 
definition of silicosis and not substitute its judgment 
as to the p·resence or absence of silicosis in p·lace of the 
judgment of the Legislature. 
The evidence is not substantial and does not even 
give "equal support to inconsistent inferences." Evi-
dence is not substantial even though it gives equal sUlpt-
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port to inconsistent inferences. App,alach.ian Elect'ric 
Pou~er Co. vs. Nati.ovnal Labo.r Relat~ons B·o1ard, sup~ra. 
II. 
DID THE COl\In1ISSIO·N ABU·SE IT'S DIISICRE·TION 
IN REFUSING AN AUT·O·P·SY IN THI:S CA·SE~ 
In this case as in Case No. 7172 the Commission 
refused an autopsy although in both cases we knew noth-
ing about the employee and never even heard of him 
until after he was de-ad and buried. In case No. 7172 
the Commission announced that its refusal was in de-
ference to the wishes of the app~licant, but in the present 
case it did not even give that as a reason. The Commis-
sion's action in this case was arbitrariness without any 
semblance of pretense otherwise. In this case appears 
the reason ·why we are never notified in these cases 
until after the man is dead and buried, from the testi-
mony of Mr. Peterson that the Secretary of the union 
advised claimants generally in the· P·ark City area not 
to report occupational disease until after the man has 
died and then to refuse an autop~sy. (R. 46, 47) In both 
cases after refusing an autopsy, which the record in 
both cases discloses would have been conclusive, the 
Commission disregarded the positive, uncontradicted evi-
dence of the outstanding authority on the subje~ct and 
made an ·award against us upon such fragments and 
conclusions as it could draw from the record from wit-
nesses whose testimony is obviously inferential at the 
best. 
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On point two our brief is largely the same in each 
case because the p·rincip1e involved in each case is iden-
tical, and the comments and authorities on one case apply 
with equal force to the other. 
We have discussed the evidence in this case before 
considering the question of the Commission's refusal of 
an autopsy bec:ause it seems to us that the Commis-
sion's arbitariness appears clearly and irrefutably from 
the decision it ma'de in the face of the re-cord. The Cnm-
mission as at present constituted aJpparently is of the 
opinion that it is omnipotent and that it has absolute 
power to take any action it sees fit to take regardless 
of the circumstances. The C·ommission did not seek to 
evaluate the facts judicially, but it ferreted out isolated 
phrases upon the assumption we suppose that if there 
were uttered any word or sentence, no matter upon what 
flimsy or unstable foundation it rested, that word or 
sentence might be the basis of a decision in this case. 
The arbitrariness of the Commission is made so much 
more manifest by its action in refusing an autopsy in 
iboth this case and in No. 7172 that we cannot let the 
matters pass. If we did, then not only is the autopsy 
statute ~eaningless but substantial rights of parties be-
fore the Industrial Commission might ce·ase to exist. 
It is true that the statute with reference to autopsy 
is not couched in mandatory language. Neither, however, 
is the Commission authorized to deny an autop,sy mere-
ly upon its own whim or caprice or upon the whim or 
caprice of any one else. The statute says that in death 
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cases fron1 an occupational disease ''where in the opin-
ion of the Conlmission it is necessary to accurately and 
scientifically ascertain the cause of death an autop·s.y 
may be ordered by any mem·ber of the C'ommission.'' In 
the present case the applicant seeks. to ·ex-act money 
fron1 us upon the premise that her son died from an 
occupational dise-ase. Surely she should not be allowe:d 
to ask us for money upon the plea that her son died from 
an occU1p1ational disease and at the same time deny us 
access to the facts that would enab1e us to determine 
whether or not he did die from such a disease. 'She 
"\V""'as not too sensitive to a,sk us _for money, but when it 
came to ·allowing us to determine whe'th'er he· did or not 
die from silicosis she became· too sensitive to allow us to 
investigate or discover that question. The very fact that 
the Commission denied our right to an autopsy under 
the facts present here itself disclos-es. an ·arbitrary and 
capricious act on the part of the Industrial Commission. 
It discloses that the opinion of the Commission was ndt 
honestly and fairly exercised. The Commission·er h·ad 
absolutely no basis for refusing an autop;sy. If Mrs. 
Mitchell didn't want an autopsy and refused one, the 
Legislature has s·aid that a he-aring should be suspended 
and she should not be p·er:rni'tted to profit by her own act 
in withholding evidence. The Industrial Commission a1-
lowed Mrs. Mitchell to prorfit at our exp·ense by deny-
ing us a right which we e·arnestly insist every fairminded 
man would con1sider we are entitled to have granted. 
'There is nothing ·wrong with autopsies. ~courts have 
appro~ed them in numerous cases as necessary and 
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essential instrumentalities for securing the truth. Every 
rule of evidence and every rule of law p1ertaining to 
trials has been promulgated,. announced and enforced 
throughout the centuries for the sole p~urpo1se of dis-
closing the . truth. In this ~as·e the lega1 machinery was 
used by the Commission to conceal the truth. We never 
even knew the man was sick until he was dead and buried. 
We obtained all the ~evidence we could, and consulted 
all the doctors who knew anything about the case to try 
and determine the cause of the man's death. It could 
not be determined. We were absolutely within our rights 
in a!sking for an autopsy, and the Commission was com-
pletely arbitrary and capricious and not governed by 
sound judicial diseretion in denying us an autopsy. ~t 
is apparent from the record that an autopsy no doubt 
would have disclosed positively that Mr. Mitchell did 
not die from silicosis. But instead of requiring the ap-
plicant to p~rove her case and placing the burden of proof 
upon her, the Commission joined with her in denying us 
a positive test that would establish without doubt her 
right or her lack of right to recover. The Commission 
also accepted con'jecture and surmise, against the positive 
evidence of the only qualified person who testified, in 
its struggle to aid this applicant-not to aid her to 
secure her rights, hut to aid hHr b~ dep~riving us of our 
rights. 
M~any cases have considered the question of the~ 
propriety of an autop·sy. There are none that we have 
been able to find that come under a statute similar to 
.ours, and most of them arise under provisions of in-
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surance policies giVIng the insurer the right to an 
autopsy. However, the right to a physical examination 
in cases where the physical condition of the plaintiff i'S 
an issue is sustained by the great majority of American 
courts upon the principle to which we referred above-
that the purpose of a trial is to de~te·rmine the truth, 
and when the p·laintiff's physical condition or that of the 
plaintiff's decedent, is in issue, the rig:q:t of the defen·dant 
to a physical examination arises as a matter of right ·e·ven 
in the absence of statutory provision therefor. Both the 
Workmen's C·ompensation .Act and the Occup,ational Di-
sease statute give this right beyond question, ( 42-1-85, 
42-la-46). 
The Kansas court in Howard vs. Hwrtford .A.ccid'ent 
and Indemnity Compa;ny (i1934) 32 Pac. ('2) 231, held 
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ap-
pointing at the request of the insurer a commission of 
physicians for the purpos·e of examining the insured's 
injured eye where the insure-d objecte·d to the testimony 
of a private physician who had previou~sly .examined his 
eye, on the groun.d that the examination was pTivileged. 
In M~eyers vs. Trovelers' InsurOIJ'IAce Comp'OJYIIY (Pa. 1946) 
46 A. (2) 224, the court held that indep·endently of any 
provision in the policy of insurance the court may order 
a physical examination of the insured, and it is not an 
unlawful invasion of his rights to require such an exam-
ination aided by stethescope, X-·ray, .etc. The remedy if 
the examination is refused by the p[aintiff is to dismiss 
his case. It would se·em to require no extended argument 
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of the physical condition of himself or another he should 
not he allowed to block and prevent any reasonable ex-
amination that will dis'Close that person's true condition. 
The courts have sustained the right of autopsy and 
find nothing repugnant in it, p'articularly when the 
autopsy will disclose the truth of the matter undeT in-
quiry. For instance in Starndard Accident Insvwranc:e Com-
pany vs. Rossi, 35 Fed. (2) 66'7, the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed because an ·autopsy was refused. Of 
courS"e the po1icy provided for an autopsy, but the prin-
ciple announced by the case is ap·plica:bJ·e here. The court 
said: ( 672) 
"From the foregoing it appears that there was 
substantial evidence to the effect that an autopsy 
might very probably have disclosed the cause of 
death, and that the condition of the body at the 
time the demand was, made would not neces·sarily, 
nor even probably, have prevented such dis·closure. 
* * * The refusal to grant it was such a breach 
of the insurance contract as would ~preclude re-
covery by appellee.' ' 
In Howes vs. United States Fidelity & Gwaroot.ee 
Comp1any, 73 Fed. (2) 611, the Ninth Circuit Court at 
page 612 said: 
'':Since there is no dispute in the instance case 
as to the facts and circumstances under which the 
demand for an autop·s.y was made, and no doubt 
that such autopsy would have 'positively' es-
tablished the cause of de·ath, we believe that the 
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effect of the refusal of the beneficiary to con. 
sent to an autopsy presented 'a question of law 
for the court, rather than a question of fact for 
the jury'."* • • (613) "When the insurance com-
pany h'as no information regarding the death or 
the cause thereof until after the body has been 
buried and there is reason to believe the post-
mortenl examination will disclose facts which will 
release the company from liability, it may be just 
and prover to hold an autopsy even after burial.'' 
That court also rej·ected the argument that provisions for 
an autop·sy are in great disfavor with the courts with 
this statement which is also applicable here: ''In this 
case, the Company had no knowledge of th·e death of the 
insur~d until after the body was interred." ('613) And 
the court also said on this point with reference to the 
'argument that courts disfavor autopsy: ''It has had no 
reference to post-mor'tem examinations for the purpose 
of detecting the commission of crime or of fraud or iln-
justice in civil proceedings." (61'3) (Italics added) In 
Clay vs . .A·etna Life Insurance Comp1any, 53 Fe·d. (2) 
689 (Minn. D. Cnnrt), Judge Sanborn a1so discusses the 
prop·riety of autop·sy and quotes from th.e case of White-
hoUSte vs. T'r!avelers' lnsru;'rlwnce Compan;y at page 693 as 
follows: 
''·The necessity of the provi,sion in accident 
policies that insurer shall have the right to make 
an autopsy can be seen 'wh·ere a man might die 
and he buri'e·d, and it be alle,ged afterward that 
the death was caused by accident, whereas, if an 
autop·sy had been made, it might have been shown 
otherwise'.'' 
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The court exp·ressly decl!ared that there was no public 
policy against autopsy under circumstances such as are 
pres·ent heire. 
'The Indus'trial .Commission app,arently proceeded 
upon the assumption that it had the absolute right with.:. 
out rhyme or reason to refuse an autop'Sy and tlrat the 
plaintiffs hHre had no rights or remedy wh!atever in the 
matter. We do not so concede the law to be. The In-
dustrial Commission at the most had only the right to 
exercise a sound judicial discre1tion. The statute itself 
p·ermits the Commission when in its opinion it is neces-
sary to accurately and scientificaTiy deter.mine the cause 
of death to order an autopsy. That opinion must he based 
upon legi'timate reasons. We do not concede the law to 
give the c·ommission the right to say ''in our opinion 
it was not necessary" when the record discloses, as it 
does here, that an autopsy is necess'ary and conclusive 
and that witholit it there is nothing but speculation, con-
jecture and inference to support the award of the Com-
. . 
IDlSSlOn. 
The Commission was required to act honestly, fair-
ly and justly. What constitutes a sound discretion has 
been judicially discussed on many occasions and this 
court also hol'ds in line with the· authorities "'That an 
abuse of discretion may be reviewed is established by 
the authorities.'' Salt Lake ·City vs. Anl.Ze~Siofn, 106 Utah 
3'50, 361, 148 Pac. (2) 346. 
Citation of a few of the cas-es dis·cussing judicial dis-
cre'tion may be of value to the court in this case. There 
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is no dissent from the p1rinciples announced in the fol-
lowing cases : Th·e Rhode Island Supreme 'Court in ~Stlr1ze­
binska vs. Jary, 193 A. 7±5, defines judicial diseretion as 
follows: ''~stated in general terms 'judicial discretion' 
means sound discretion, exercised not arbitrarily or will-
fully, but with just regard to what is right and .equitable 
under the circumstances and the law.'' The Sup1reme 
Court of Iowa in Arthood vs. Grtiffin, 217 N.W. 809, ap-
proved several definitions, al1 of which amount t'O the 
same thing, as follows: 
"Judicial discretion is a phrase of great 
latitude; but it never means the arbitrary will of 
the judge. * * * It is a legal discretion foun·ded · 
upon conditions which call for judicial action as 
distinguishe·d from mere individual or personal 
view or desire.'' 
And from 18 C. J. page lt35, Sec. 3: 
''However incapable of exact ·definition, it 
is clearly recognized that discretion is not ab-
solutely without elements, conditions, or limita-
tions. T·he term implies the a~bsence of a hard 
and fast rule, yet it should not he another word 
for' arbitrary will', 'inconsiderate action', or 'un-
stable caprice'." 
In Lee vs. Baltimo~e Hotel Compall'll!J, 1'36 S.W. ('2) 
69'5, the Missouri Supreme C:~urlt s·aid: 
'''We have said that such a discretion does not' 
mean a mere whim or caprice, but it m·eans an 
honest a;ttempt, in the exercise of a judge in his 
duty and power to see that justice is done, to 
establish a legal right.'' 
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In the case now before us the Commission knew that 
we had never heard of this case until the man was dead 
and buried. The Commission knew that the medical evi-
dence was hazy; that we had evidenced a willingness to 
pay if it was demonstrated that the decease·d died as a 
result of silicosis; that autopsy was now the only way 
we could get this information. The Commission knew 
that we had talked to all the doctors and knew what they 
had told us. In spite of this and for no reason whatever 
an autopsy was refused. Then on the basis of such hazy 
evidence and in the absence of an autopsy an award was 
made against us allowing the applicant to profit by re-
fusing us a reasonable, justifiable and honest request to 
secure information which, without question, would have 
established whether or not the ap,plicant was entitled 
to comp~ensation. The Commission used it's power to 
thwart justice not to promote it; i't used its power to 
conceal eiVidence not to bring it to light; it used its power 
arbitrarily and cap·riciously and inexcusably discrimin-
ated against us in this proce·eding. Then the Commis-
·sion disregarded substantial and convincing evidence in 
order to find some basis upon which to make an award 
against us when true and positive evidence lay locked 
in the vault with the keys in the hands of the Commis-
sion. 'They refused to open the vault. We submit that 
the Industrial Commission flagrantly abused its discre-
tion in this case, and the award should not stand. 
We also call to the court's attention the wording of 
the award. As we understand the statute ( ~2-l'a-25) as 
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amended, (1945) compensation when properly awarded 
is payable at the rate of $16.00 plus p,er week with a cer-
tain maximum beyond which it cann·ot go. In the event 
of death or remarriage of a dependent the compensation 
ceases or is diminished. In this case, however, the Com-
mission awards the maximum, (R. 13), regardless of any 
contingency that may happen in the future, whereas, in 
our judgment it should have awarded weekly payments 
in accordance with the statute not to exceed the allow-
~ble maximum. The Commission made no finding what-
ever that Mrs. Mitchell is a dependent. There is nothing 
in the record to show that she was dependent. She testi-
fied that she owned her own home, she bought her own 
clothes. After the death of her son she put in a te1e-
phone, and she paid the lights. She receives money from 
social security or public welfare. Her son bought her 
food and his food. What that amounted to does not ap-
pear. He paid the taxe's on the house, and at some time 
in the past had d'one something towards remodeling it, 
whether by means of money or his own work does not 
appear, nor does it appear of what the remodeling c·on-
sisted. We think that it would be impossible for a fair-
minded p·erson to hold that this applicant was de·pendent 
upon her son. Certainly, there is no evidence in this 
record to support such a finding, and in fact there i·s 
no such finding. T1he award is not sup·piorted by any 
finding whatever in this case, nor is there any evidence 
to support the funeral, medical or hospital expenses 
awarded. It may be that these matters are technical and 
not the real vice of these cases. But the Commission 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
persists in making its awards In this fashion, and to 
avoi·d complications that might arise We· submit that the 
award shou1·d conform with the statute. If the dependent 
died or remarried, there might be an argument that the 
award in a total sum was a judgment and had become 
final and not subje·ct to review and the employer might 
be confronted with improper demands because of the 
form of the award. 
For the foregoing reasons we submit that the award 
of the c~ommission should be set as·ide and annuHed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SiHIRL,EY P. JONE1S 
Attorney ~or Plaimt~ffs. 
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